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Abstract: Together with the increase in the number of public-private contracts, recent 
years have seen a marked proliferation in public-private arbitrations. This article explores 
the public interest implications which may arise in such arbitrations and examines how 
public-private arbitration is treated under English law. We argue that, due to the lack of 
a developed administrative law sphere in England and the historical development of 
arbitration as an exclusively private mode of dispute resolution, the current legal 
framework of arbitration in England has developed around the private law paradigm of a 
commercial dispute involving private actors. This private law paradigm results in a 
conceptual and legal void in respect of how public interest is accounted for, and protected, 
in arbitrations involving public bodies under English law. Therefore, we suggest that 
English arbitration law needs to reconceptualise public-private arbitration and embed it 
in a public law narrative. 
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I. Introduction  
 
The last forty years have witnessed an increased interaction between public and private 
sectors and increased reliance on private actors to perform public functions in a wide 
range of areas, including complex infrastructure projects, welfare accommodation, crime 
and justice and military and defence. These developments have led to a substantial 
increase in the number of public-private contracts, many of which favour arbitration and 
other private forms of dispute resolution over the traditional resolution of disputes in the 
national courts. Although, like a typical commercial arbitration between private parties, 
public-private arbitrations arise out of a contractual dispute, the crucial point of 
distinction is the public interest implications associated with the latter and it is these 
implications that make public-private arbitration important to examine. 
 
This article aims to clarify the concept of public-private arbitration and to critique the 
way in which public-private arbitration is treated under English arbitration law. The main 
thesis of this article is that the private law paradigm upon which English arbitration law 
is based leaves the public interest both unaccounted for, and unprotected, in respect of 
public-private arbitrations. 
 
The article proceeds as follows: Section II offers an account of the rise of public-private 
arbitration. Section III examines more closely the definition of public-private arbitration 
and, in particular, the concept of the public interest.  Section IV examines the treatment 
of public-private arbitration under English law and demonstrates that English law fails to 
distinguish between private arbitrations and public-private arbitrations and has developed 
around the private law paradigm of a commercial dispute.  
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While English law applies a private law paradigm to public-private arbitrations, as 
Section V shows, other jurisdictions have recognised the distinct nature of public-private 
arbitration. The lack of a distinct legal and conceptual framework for public-private 
arbitration in England raises two important questions. The first question is why such a 
framework is lacking under English law. As Section VI argues, this can be attributed to 
the lack of a developed administrative law sphere in England and to the fact that English 
arbitration law has developed as an exclusively private mode of dispute resolution. The 
second, possibly more important, question is whether the existing private law paradigm 
on which English arbitration law is based can adequately protect the public interest. This 
question is addressed in Section VII, which argues that the private law paradigm 
underlying English arbitration law leaves the public interest both unaccounted for, and 
unprotected, in respect of public-private arbitrations. The final section makes some 
proposals as to how this deficit may be addressed.  
 
II. The rise of public-private arbitration 
 
Traditionally, arbitration has been the predominant mode of dispute resolution for 
contractual disputes between two private parties, typically corporations. However, in 
recent years with the collapse of the non-arbitrability doctrine, the scope of arbitration 
has greatly expanded. In the area of commercial arbitration, for example, it is now 
accepted that arbitrators have authority to determine not only claims pertaining to the 
formation, interpretation and performance of commercial contracts, but also statutory 
claims that may have crucial social implications,1 such as competition law claims, tax 
                                                        
1T. Carbonneau, ‘Cartesian Logic and Frontier Politics: French and American Concepts of Arbitrability’ 
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claims or claims arising out of securities transactions.2 Similarly, in the area of investment 
law, international arbitration tribunals regularly review investor claims concerning 
government measures, including financial and environmental measures, which concern 
the regulatory sovereignty of the host nation and would normally fall within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of national courts.3  
 
Concurrent with this development, a combination of economic and ideological factors 
has led to increased interaction between public and private sectors and increased reliance 
on private actors to perform public functions in virtually every industrialised state.4 In the 
UK, the transfer of government powers to the private sector gathered pace during the 
1980s. 5  Such outsourcing arrangements can take various forms including entrusting 
private partners with the legal responsibility to provide such services (‘contracting out’) 
and collaborating with private parties for the purpose of achieving a public function, albeit 
                                                        
(1994) 2 Tul J Intl & Comp L 196. 
2 K. Youssef, ‘The Death of Inarbitrability’ in L. Mistelis and S. Brekoulakis (eds), Arbitrability: 
International and Comparative Perspectives (Kluwer 2009) 47. See generally L. Mistelis and S. 
Brekoulakis (eds), Arbitrability: International and Comparative Perspectives (Kluwer 2009). 
3UNCTAD, ‘World Investment Report 2015: Reforming International Investment Governance’ (UNCTAD 
2015) xi.  
4J. Freeman, ‘The Private Role in Public Governance’ (2000) 75 NYU L Rev 543; J.B. Auby, ‘Contracting 
Out and ‘Public Values’: A Theoretical and Comparative Approach’ in S. Rose-Ackerman and P.L. 
Lindseth (eds), Comparative Administrative Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2013) 512. 
5A. Davies, Accountability: A Public Law Analysis of Government by Contract (Oxford University Press 
2001) 3. 
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that ultimate legal responsibility to the public remains with the public body.6 Legislative 
developments have lent impetus to this movement by, for example, requiring local 
authorities to engage in competitive tendering processes7 and by facilitating the exercise 
of certain public powers by private entities.8 These developments, in turn, have led to a 
marked increase in the number of public-private contracts (ie contracts entered into by 
public bodies with private entities).9  
 
The connection between these two developments - the expansion of arbitration’s domain 
and the rise of the ‘contracting state’ - is the fact that many public-private contracts favour 
arbitration and other private forms of dispute resolution over resolution of disputes in the 
national courts.10 For example, the Model Terms and Conditions of Contracts for Goods 
issued by the UK Office of Government Commerce provide for a multi-tiered dispute 
resolution process which ends in arbitration in the event that informal negotiation and 
mediation are unsuccessful11 and similar dispute resolution provisions are common in 
                                                        
6See M. Freedland, ‘Public law and private finance – placing the Private Finance Initiative in a public 
frame’ [1998] PL 288; C. Harlow and R. Rawlings, Law and Administration (3rd edn, Cambridge University 
Press 2009) ch 9. 
7See Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public 
procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65–242.  
8See Deregulation and Contracting Out Act 1994. 
9J.B. Auby, ‘Comparative Approaches to the Rise of Contract in the Public Sphere’ [2007] PL 40, 41. See 
also A. Davies, The Public Law of Government Contracts (Oxford University Press 2008) 61. 
10G.S. Tawil, ‘On the Internationalisation of Administrative Contracts, Arbitration and the Calvo Doctrine’ 
in A. van den Berg (ed), Arbitration Advocacy in Changing Times, ICCA Congress Series No 15 (Kluwer 
2011) 325. 
11Office of Government Commerce, ‘OGC Model Terms and Conditions of Contracts for Services’ (OGC 
2009) clause I2.  See also HM Treasury, Standardisation of PFI Contracts (4th edn, 2007) ch 28.  
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standard forms of international construction contracts, typically adopted for procurement 
of public works. 12  Recent years have therefore seen both the general expansion of 
arbitration’s domain as well as an increase in the number of public-private contracts 
providing for arbitration.  
 
The expansion of arbitrations arising under public-private contracts has been 
accompanied by an increase in other forms of arbitration between public and private 
entities. In particular, since the registration of the first dispute under a bilateral investment 
treaty in 1987, 13  the number of investment treaty arbitration cases (ie international 
arbitrations between a state entity and a foreign investor under an international investment 
treaty) has increased exponentially. 14  However, investment treaty arbitration can be 
distinguished from contractual arbitrations between public and private bodies in a number 
of ways. In particular, while in contractual arbitrations, consent to arbitration is provided 
in the form of an arbitration clause, international investment treaties hold out to investors 
the right to consent to submit their dispute with the state hosting their investments to 
arbitration. 15  Secondly, while contractual disputes are required to be determined in 
accordance with the governing law of the contract, disputes in investment treaty 
                                                        
12See for example FIDIC, ‘Conditions of Contract for Construction, which are recommended for building 
or engineering works designed by the Employer or by his representative, the Engineer’ (FIDIC 1999) clause 
20.6.  
13Asian Agricultural Products Ltd v Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No ARB/87/3, 4 ISCID Rep 245.   
14As of July 2016, the total number of known treaty-based investor-state arbitrations is 696: see UNCTAD 
Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/isds (last accessed 26 
July 2016). 
15See Occidental Exploration and Production Company v Ecuador [2005] EWHC 774 (Comm); Occidental 
Exploration and Production Company v Ecuador [2006] 2 WLR 70.  
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arbitration often arise out of the regulatory actions of the state hosting the investor’s 
investment and concern rights and obligations at the level of public international law 
under international treaties.16 
 
Both forms of arbitration may, however, have implications for the public interest. The 
public interest implications associated with investment treaty arbitrations 17  and the 
question of whether investment treaty arbitration should be considered to form part of 
private or public law have been the subject of extensive discourse.18 However, the issues 
associated with contractual arbitrations between public and private bodies are less well 
traversed and the question of whether such arbitrations should be viewed through a 
private law or a public law lens has not been sufficiently explored under domestic law 
and certainly not under English law.19 This article examines these issues and therefore, 
while acknowledging that the term ‘public-private arbitration’ may be defined to 
                                                        
16In relation to a third form of investment arbitration, namely that under national legislation, see C. 
Schreuer, ‘Investment Arbitration based on National Legislation’ in G. Hafner, F. Matscher and K. 
Schmalenbach (eds), Völkerrecht und die Dynamik der Menschenrechte, Liber Amicorum Wolfram Karl 
(Facultas 2012). 
17 See for example P. Dupuy, E. Petersmann and F. Francioni (eds), Human Rights in International 
Investment Law and Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2009); M. Cordonier Segger, M. W. Gehring and 
A. Newcombe (eds), Sustainable Development in World Investment Law (Kluwer 2011).  
18See for example G. Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford University Press 
2007); S. W. Schill (ed), International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (Oxford University 
Press 2010).  
19There has been some debate on this topic in relation to other jurisdictions: see for example D. Renders, 
P. Delvolvé and T. Tanquerel (eds), L’arbitrage en droit public (Bruylant 2010); M. Audit (ed), Contrats 
publics et arbitrage international (Bruylant 2011). 
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encompass investment treaty arbitration, 20  uses that term to describe a contractual 
arbitration between a public body and a private body which implicates the public 
interest.21  
 
While certain issues pertinent to public-private arbitration have been touched upon in 
existing literature, the phenomenon of public-private arbitration has not been focussed 
upon. Thus, while a number of authors have recognised that arbitration does not fit neatly 
into the category of ‘private’ governance as it depends upon state support22  and as 
arbitrators may need to take account of mandatory rules of law,23 this analysis has not 
focussed on the role of public bodies as participants in arbitrations. In addition, the 
‘vanishing trial’ phenomenon (ie the increasing tendency to resolve disputes other than 
by judicial determination and, in particular, through alternative dispute resolution (ADR)) 
and its effect on the protection of certain public interests has been the subject of 
                                                        
20See for example S. Schill, ‘Transnational Private-Public Arbitration as Global Regulatory Governance: 
Charting and Codifying the Lex Mercatoria Publica’ at http://acil.uva.nl/research/research-
projects/content/transnational-private-public-arbitration-lexmercpub.html (last accessed 26 July 2016).  
21 See Section III below. 
22 See for example C. A. Whytock, ‘Private-Public Interaction in Global Governance: The Case of 
Transnational Commercial Arbitration’ (2010) 12 Business & Politics: Article 10. See also A. Stone Sweet, 
‘The new Lex Mercatoria and Transnational Governance’ (2006) 13 J Eur Pub Pol’y 627.  
23A. F.  M.  Maniruzzaman, ‘International Arbitrator and Mandatory Public Law Rules in the Context of 
State Contracts: An Overview’ (1990) 7 J Int’l Arb 53; M. Blessing, ‘Mandatory Rules of Law versus Party 
Autonomy in International Arbitration’ (1997) 14 J Int’l Arb 23; A. Barraclough and J. Waincymer, 
‘Mandatory Rules of Law in International Commercial Arbitration’ (2005) 6 Melb J Int’l L 205; A. 
Sheppard, ‘Mandatory Rules in International Commercial Arbitration – An English Law Perspective’ 
(2007) 18 Am Rev Int’l Arb 121.  
10 
 
commentary24 as have the issues associated with using ADR to resolve public law cases 
in particular.25  However, this analysis has concentrated primarily on the negotiated 
settlement of public law disputes26 or on the use of facilitative ADR processes such as 
mediation.27 Finally, a considerable body of literature has developed in the UK which 
describes the rise of ‘government by contract’ and highlights the need for public law to 
evolve to take account of this contractualisation process.28 However, this literature does 
not focus on the implications of the use of arbitration, as a private dispute resolution 
mechanism, in respect of disputes under public-private contracts.29 Therefore, while, in 
                                                        
24See for example M. Galanter, ‘The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in 
Federal and State Courts’ (2004) 1 J Emp Leg Stud 459; R. Dingwall and E. Cloatre, ‘Vanishing Trials?: 
An English Perspective’ (2006) J Disp Resol 51; Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, ‘The Fourth Keating 
Lecture: Equity, ADR, Arbitration and The Law: Different Dimensions of Justice’ (19 May 2010); L. 
Mulcahy, ‘The Collective Interest in Private Dispute Resolution’ (2013) 33 OJLS 59. 
25See for example V. Bondy, M. Doyle and V. Reid, ‘Mediation and Judicial Review - Mind the Research 
Gap’ (2005) 10 Jud Rev 220; M. Supperstone, D. Stilitz and C. Sheldon, ‘ADR and Public Law’ [2006] PL 
299. 
26See for example O. M. Fiss, ‘Against Settlement’ (1983-1984) 98 Yale LJ 1073; D. Luban, ‘Settlements 
and the Erosion of the Public Realm’ (1994-1995) 83 Geo LJ 2619; V. Bondy and M. Sunkin, ‘Settlement 
in judicial review proceedings’ [2009] PL 237. 
27See for example V. Bondy and L. Mulcahy, ‘Mediation and Judicial Review: An empirical research study’ 
(The Public Law Project 2009). 
28See for example G. S. Morris and S. Fredman, ‘The Costs of Exclusivity: Public and Private Re-examined’ 
[1994] PL 69; Mark R. Freedland, ‘Government by Contract and Public Law’ [1994] PL 86; M. Freedland, 
‘Public law and private finance – placing the Private Finance Initiative in a public frame’ [1998] PL 288; 
P. Vincent-Jones, ‘The regulation of contractualisation in quasi-markets for public services’ [1999] PL 304; 
A. Davies, Accountability: A Public Law Analysis of Government by Contract (Oxford University Press 
2001). 
29cf A. Davies, The Public Law of Government Contracts (Oxford University Press 2008) 224-227. 
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different contexts, it has been recognised that contracts with public bodies are not purely 
creatures of private law, that arbitration does not fit neatly into the category of ‘private’ 
governance and that the use of ADR may, in certain cases, adversely affect certain public 
interests, the rise of public-private arbitration and its legal treatment, which straddles 
these issues, has remained largely uncharted.  
 
III. Public-private arbitration and the public interest  
 
This section further explores what is meant by the term public-private arbitration and, in 
particular, the concept of the public interest. However, it is first necessary to consider 
what is meant by a ‘public body’ in the context of public-private arbitration. In 
determining what is meant by this term, a ‘source’ based test or a ‘functional’ based test 
may be applied. The former test focusses on the source of power of the body in question 
and considers whether the body’s power derives from statute or prerogative. On the other 
hand, a ‘functional’ based test examines the nature of the power exercised by the body 
and, in particular, whether it has a ‘public element’ or is under some ‘public duty’.30 
Application of this ‘functional’ based test is not without its difficulties.31 However, as its 
inherent flexibility has the potential to address the increasing exercise of public power 
and performance of public functions by private parties (a problem which also lies at the 
heart of this article), the term ‘public body’ is, for the purposes of this article, used to 
describe not only ‘obvious’ public authorities but also those bodies that perform a public 
function or are under some public duty. 
 
                                                        
30 R v Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers, ex p Datafin [1987] 2 WLR 699.  
31 See Section VI below. 
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Crucially however, the definition of public-private arbitration requires not only that a 
contractual dispute between a public and private body has been submitted to arbitration 
but also that the dispute implicates the public interest.32 Therefore, as the concept of 
public interest is an integral part of the definition of public-private arbitration and as it 
informs the approach taken in this article, it is necessary to take a closer look at its 
meaning. Defining what is meant by the public interest is difficult,33 as the term carries a 
variety of meanings depending on the context in which it is used: for example, the term 
public interest may have a different meaning in constitutional discourse than it has in 
discourse relating to economics, sociology, political theory or regulation.34  
 
As Held’s seminal work demonstrated, there are three types of approaches to public 
interest: common interest theories, preponderance theories and unitary conceptions.35 
Common interest theories are based on the hypothetical of the existence of interests 
common to all members of society, while preponderance theories look to a majority of 
interests. Common and preponderance interest theories thus tend to conceptualise public 
interest on a majoritarian basis. On the other hand, the unitary conception takes a 
                                                        
32Similarly, under English law, not all decisions made by a public body are subject to judicial review. An 
additional ‘public law’ element is required: see  J. Beatson, ‘Which Regulatory Bodies are Subject to the 
Human Rights Act?’ in J. Beatson  (ed), The Human Rights Act and the Criminal Justice and Regulatory 
Process (Hart Publishing 1999) 102. 
33See generally S. M. King, B. S. Chilton and G. E. Roberts, ‘Reflections on Defining the Public Interest’ 
(2010) 41 Administration & Society 954.  
34ibid 966. 
35V. Held, The public interest and individual interests (Basic Books 1970). 
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normative approach and places emphasis on what ought to be in the public interest from 
a social welfare viewpoint.36 
 
While a crude conception of democracy would favour a majoritarian approach to public 
interest, in a system displaying constitutional features, the public interest can, and should, 
be directed towards serving fundamental constitutional values, including values reflecting 
minority interests.37 In the context of English law therefore, we subscribe to an inclusive 
definition of public interest as a set of interests reflecting the minimal value structure 
underpinning society, as these values are shaped by constitutional and administrative law 
principles, and democratic institutions and traditions.38 Such a normative approach allows 
us to identify a core meaning of public interest in considering disputes under public-
private contracts.  
 
Thus, where economic and social policy considerations arise in connection with a 
contractual dispute between a public body and a private body, the public interest is 
implicated. Economic considerations include considerations such as ‘value for money’ 
(which arise, for example, in relation to procurement contracts), the allocation of public 
resources and the development of important infrastructure needed for the operation of an 
economy (such as airports and highways).39 Social policy considerations include issues 
relating to the implementation of governmental policies in sectors that are sensitive for 
                                                        
36M. Feintuck, The Public Interest in Regulation (Oxford University Press 2014) 11. 
37A. Kulick, Global Public Interest in International Investment Law (Cambridge University Press 2012) 
151-152. See also I. O’Flynn, ‘Deliberating About the Public Interest’ (2010) 16 Res Publica 299, 313. 
38n 33 above, 958.  
39See G. Niemeyer, ‘Public Interest and Private Utility’ in C.J. Friedrich (ed), Nomos V: The Public Interest 
(Atherton Press 1962). 
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the public, such as health, education, social welfare and immigration. Where a contractor 
is involved in providing services directly to members of the public, it can be considered 
more likely that a dispute under that contract will implicate the public interest40 than 
where the contractor is merely contributing to an activity which is controlled and co-
ordinated by the public body (eg where the contractor is supplying goods or support 
services to the public body).41 However, it is not possible to draw a bright line distinction 
between these two categories of contract as disputes under the latter category of contract 
can also implicate the public interest where, for example, the contract is high-value and 
where performance of the contract is essential to the provision of an essential public 
service or to the implementation of important governmental policies. In requiring more 
than just the presence of a contract with a public body to trigger the application of a public 
interest analysis, this approach is consistent with that taken by the English courts to the 
analogous issue of determining the applicability of public law to the actions of a private 
service provider. 42  
 
Having established a working definition of public interest, a recent example of a public-
private arbitration with public interest implications is worth considering. This concerned 
a dispute between the Secretary of State for the Home Department and the US defence 
company, Raytheon Systems Limited, in respect of a 2007 contract for the design, 
development and delivery of a multimillion pound technology system (e-Borders) which 
would reform UK border controls by establishing an electronic system to vet travellers 
                                                        
40For a related argument A. Davies, The Public Law of Government Contracts (Oxford University Press 
2008) ch 8.  
41ibid 55 and 79 referring to a contract to supply paper clips to a public authority as an archetypal example 
of a contract to which application of public law norms would be inappropriate. 
42See Section VI below.  
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entering and leaving the UK. When the Home Office terminated the contract in 2010 for 
significant delays in progress of the works, Raytheon commenced arbitration proceedings 
claiming substantial damages for unlawful termination. The arbitration proceedings under 
the rules of the London Court of International Arbitration were confidential with the 
arbitrators being English and American (nominated by the Home Office and Raytheon 
respectively) and the chairman being Canadian. The arbitrators decided, apparently 
within an exclusive private law setting, that the Home Office had unlawfully terminated 
the contract and awarded damages to Raytheon of the amount of approximately £190 
million plus £38 million in respect of interest and the claimant’s costs. The E-borders 
award raised serious concerns in the British government and attracted intensive media 
and public interest, with the focus being on the impact of the award on the public finances 
and on UK border security.43 While the award was challenged by the Home Office and 
was subsequently set aside by the High Court for serious irregularity,44 the High Court 
ultimately determined that the dispute should be referred back to arbitration before a 
different panel of arbitrators.45 Following the issuance of the High Court judgment in 
February 2015, Keith Vaz, the chairman of the Commons home affairs select committee, 
observed that the E-borders dispute had ‘cost the British taxpayer millions of pounds. We 
still do not have an e-Borders programme, nor do we have information that can help us 
determine what went wrong with the Raytheon contract’.46  Despite the Home Office’s 
success in challenging the arbitration award, the Home Office announced in March 2015 
                                                        
43 See B. Quinn, ‘UK taxpayer faces £220m bill over e-borders contract termination’ The Guardian 
(London, 19 August 2014). 
44 The Secretary of State for the Home Department v Raytheon Systems Limited [2014] EWHC 4375 (TCC). 
45The Secretary of State for the Home Department v Raytheon Systems Limited [2015] EWHC 311 (TCC). 
46Quoted in A. Travis, ‘Award for cancellation of e-Borders contract is set aside by court’ The Guardian 
(London, 17 February 2015). 
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that it had reached a negotiated resolution with Raytheon and was to pay £150 million to 
Raytheon in full and final settlement of the dispute.47 
 
Overall, public-private arbitrations can have far-reaching implications for the public 
interest and, as will be elaborated upon in Section VII, may give rise to threats to 
fundamental public law norms. This makes it important to analyse how English law views 
public-private arbitration and, in particular, to examine how the public interest is 
accounted for under English arbitration law.  
 
IV. English arbitration law and public-private arbitration 
 
While the use of arbitration to resolve disputes between a public body and a private party 
has become more common, 48  English law does not distinguish between private 
arbitrations and public-private arbitrations. Indeed, having developed around the private 
law paradigm of a commercial dispute involving private actors,49 English arbitration law 
characterises has adopted party autonomy as its cardinal principle. Thus, the submission 
of a dispute to arbitration is conceptualised as a process whereby the parties 
(archetypically sophisticated commercial parties negotiating at arm’s length) choose to 
                                                        
47Home Office letter on e-Borders settlement, 27 March 2015, at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/home-secretary-letter-on-e-borders-settlement (last accessed 26 
July 2016). 
48A. Wald and J. Kalicki, ‘The Settlement of Disputes between the Public Administration and Private 
Companies by Arbitration under Brazilian Law’ (2009) 26 J Int’l Arb 557, 559. 
49See generally J. D. M. Lew and M. Holm, ‘Chapter 1: Development of the Arbitral System in England’ 
in J. D. M. Lew, H. Bor, et al (eds), Arbitration in England, with chapters on Scotland and Ireland (Kluwer 
Law International 2013).   
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contract out of the system of public justice and submit their disputes to a private dispute 
resolution mechanism. In accordance with this ‘contractual’ understanding of 
arbitration,50 the Arbitration Act 1996 (the 1996 Act) requires the English courts to adopt 
a non-interventionist approach in respect of the arbitration process. This means that the 
role of the courts up to the point at which the award is made does not vary depending on 
whether or not the arbitration involves a public body.  
  
Further, English law does not differentiate between public-private arbitrations and private 
arbitrations in considering whether a particular dispute may be submitted to arbitration or 
whether public bodies can submit to arbitration. This lack of differentiation also extends 
to the conduct of the proceedings, including the appointment of arbitrators, the 
qualifications which arbitrators are required to have, the presentation of evidence, the 
grounds for intervention by third parties (including members of the public) and, 
significantly, the question of whether the arbitration proceedings will be private and 
confidential.  
 
Similarly, after the arbitration is concluded, the scope of review of arbitration awards by 
English courts does not depend on whether or not the arbitration involves a public body 
or implicates the public interest. Once the arbitration tribunal has rendered its award, a 
party may generally only challenge the award on the basis that the tribunal lacked 
substantive jurisdiction (under section 67 of the 1996 Act), that there was a serious 
irregularity affecting the tribunal, proceedings or award (under section 68 of the 1996 
                                                        
50See generally A. Barraclough and J. Waincymer, ‘Mandatory Rules of Law in International Commercial 
Arbitration’ (2005) 6 Melb J Int’l L 205, 209-210. 
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Act) 51 or, in certain limited circumstances, on a question of law (under section 69 of the 
1996 Act).52  
 
Thus, under section 68, the challenging party must demonstrate conduct amounting to a 
serious irregularity which falls within the exhaustive list of categories in section 68(2) 
and that the irregularities identified caused, or will cause, the party substantial injustice. 
Accordingly, the House of Lords has remarked that section 68 was conceived of: ‘...as a 
long stop only available in extreme cases where the tribunal has gone so wrong in its 
conduct of the arbitration that justice calls out for it to be corrected.’53 Similarly, as 
section 69 of the 1996 Act is not mandatory in nature,54 parties often agree in advance 
that an arbitration award will be final and binding and cannot be appealed.55 Furthermore, 
even where the possibility of an appeal under section 69 has not been excluded, unless all 
other parties to the proceedings agree to such appeal, leave of the court must be sought to 
bring the appeal and leave will only be granted if certain requirements specified in section 
                                                        
51See Vinava Shipping Co Ltd v Finelvet AG (The Chrysalis) [1983] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 503; Guangzhou 
Dockyards Co Ltd v ENE Aegiali I [2010] EWHC 2826 (Comm). 
52Admittedly, in allowing for an appeal on a question of law at all, English law permits greater judicial 
intervention than those jurisdictions that have adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law: see  D. Wolfson and 
S. Charlwood, ‘Chapter 25: Challenges to Arbitration Awards’ in J. D. M. Lew, H. Bor, et al (eds.), 
Arbitration in England, with chapters on Scotland and Ireland (Kluwer Law International 2013) at [25-68] 
– [25-69]. 
53Lesotho Highlands Development Authority v Impregilo SpA and others [2005] 3 All ER 789 at [27], citing 
the Report of the Departmental Advisory Committee of Arbitration Law on the then Arbitration Bill at 
[280]. 
54Arbitration Act 1996, s 4(1) and Sched 1.  
55A. Sheppard, ‘Mandatory Rules in International Commercial Arbitration – An English Law Perspective’ 
(2007) 18 Am Rev Int'l Arb 121, 136.  
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69(3) of the 1996 Act are satisfied. For these reasons, leave to appeal on a point of law is 
rarely granted by English courts and successful section 69 applications are rare.56 Overall 
therefore, the grounds for challenge of arbitration awards under English law are framed 
narrowly, fall short of providing for a review of the award on the merits (including an 
error in law) and do not differentiate as between public-private and private arbitrations.  
 
To date therefore, the rise of public-private arbitration has left undisturbed the private law 
paradigm underlying English arbitration law. This means that arbitration and public law 
have been regarded as occupying separate legal spheres and neither area of law has 
substantially influenced the design or practice of the other.57 In adopting this approach, 
English law differs from the approach taken in a number of other jurisdictions, in which 
the potential for overlap between arbitration law and public law has been recognised. 
 
V. Public-private arbitration in other jurisdictions 
 
While English law applies a private law paradigm to public-private arbitrations, certain 
distinctions between public-private arbitration and private arbitration have been 
recognised in other jurisdictions. For a start, many jurisdictions have imposed restrictions 
on the extent to which public bodies can submit disputes to arbitration.58 While recent 
                                                        
56 M. Marshall, ‘Section 69 almost 20 years on….’, Kluwer Arbitration Blog 24 June 2015, at: 
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2015/06/24/section-69-almost-20-years-on/ (last accessed 26 July 
2016). 
57On a similar topic see M. Supperstone, D. Stilitz and C. Sheldon, ‘ADR and Public Law’ [2006] PL 299.  
58n 48 above, 559-563. See also J. D. M. Lew, L. A. Mistelis and S. Kröll, Comparative International 
Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer 2003) 733-737. 
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years have seen a loosening of some of these restrictions,59  they are indicative of a 
different perspective on the relationship between arbitration law and public law. For 
example, in France, public bodies are generally prohibited from entering into arbitration 
agreements by Article 2060 of the Civil Code which provides to the effect that ‘there can 
be no arbitration…in disputes concerning public bodies and institutions and more 
generally in all matters in which public policy is concerned.’ This rule, which is regarded 
as a general principle of French public law,60 recognises that arbitration may not be an 
appropriate forum to deal with public interest matters. Over the years and because of the 
growth in commercial collaborations between the public and private sectors, a number of 
exceptions to this rule have emerged.61 For example, in the Galakis case, the Cour de 
Cassation ruled that a French public body may consent to an arbitration agreement in 
connection with an international commercial contract.62 However, notwithstanding this 
trend, in INSERM v Fondation Letten F. Saugstad, it was recognised that, while the 
judicial courts will normally review an award between a French public body and a foreign 
legal entity, public-private arbitration awards should be subject to review by the 
administrative rather than the judicial courts where ‘mandatory rules of French public 
law’ are implicated.  
 
                                                        
59ibid. 
60See Conseil d’Etat, Legal Opinion (Avis) of 6 March 1986, No. 339710.  
61See for example Law No. 75-596 of 9 July 1975. See generally T. A. Brabant, ‘Arbitration and Company 
Law in France’ (2015) 12 Eur Company L 144, 144-148. 
62Cour de Cassation, 2 May 1966, 1966 Bull Civ I 199.  See also H. Batiffol, ‘Arbitration Clauses 
Concluded between French Government-Owned Enterprises and Foreign Private Parties’ (1968) 7 Colum 
J Transnat’l L 32. 
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The INSERM decision can be interpreted as representing a resurgence of the public-
private law divide in French arbitration law.63 This resurgence can also been seen in 
recent amendments to the procedure for arbitration proceedings: while the procedure for 
arbitration proceedings is substantially the same under French law whether these 
proceedings involve private or public entities, in the recent amendment of the French 
arbitration law in 2011, the principle of confidentiality of arbitration proceedings, which 
is normally applicable by default to domestic arbitrations, was not extended to 
international arbitrations.64 As is generally accepted, one of the main reasons for this 
distinction was to ensure that arbitrations involving public bodies are conducted in a 
transparent manner.65 Similarly, in Brazil, a recently enacted arbitration law66 provides 
that public-private arbitration is subject to ‘the principle of publicity’ and all other laws 
governing transparency in public affairs.67     
 
VI. Reasons underlying the English approach to public-private arbitration 
 
The lack of a distinct legal and conceptual framework for public-private arbitration in 
England raises two important questions. The first question is why such a framework is 
lacking. The second, and possibly more important, question is whether the existing 
private law paradigm on which English arbitration law is based can adequately account 
                                                        
63cf the recent decision of the Cour de Cassation (8 July 2015) in Syndicat mixte des Aéroports de Charente 
v Ryanair, Arrêt n° 797 du 8 juillet 2015 (13-25.846).  
64Decree No. 2011-48 of 13 January 2011. 
65E. Gaillard and P. de Lapasse, ‘Commentaire analytique du décret du 13 janvier 2011 portant réforme du 
droit français de l’arbitrage’ (2011) 2 Cahiers de l’Arbitrage 263 at [106].  
66 Law No. 13,129 of 26 May 2015.  
67ibid Article 1 § 1o and Article 2 § 3o. 
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for the public interest in arbitrations involving public bodies. We examine both questions 
in turn.  
 
There are two reasons that can explain the lack of a distinct legal and conceptual 
framework for public-private arbitration in England. The first is the lack of a developed 
administrative law sphere and of a separate body of administrative courts which would 
claim interest in the regulation of public-private arbitrations. In England, disputes 
involving public bodies with public interest implications have traditionally been 
submitted to the same ordinary courts as disputes between two private parties, and largely 
have been subject to the same procedure.68 The absence of a body of administrative law 
rules extraneous to the common law can be contrasted with the emergence of 
administrative power and the strict separation between administration and justice in 
Continental Europe. In this regard, the French revolution of 1789 was the catalyst for the 
emergence of administration publique.69 While previously the space between the state 
and the citizen was occupied by monarchy and a corporate society (the ancien régime),70 
after the French revolution this space came to be occupied by the State which developed 
its own institutional capacities, in order to pursue the interests of the public. Therefore, 
under the law of 16-24 August 1790, the ordinary courts in France were prohibited from 
reviewing administrative acts. However, while the lawmakers of the revolutionary period 
                                                        
68cf Civil Procedure Rules, Part 54. 
69B. Sordi ‘Révolution, Rechtsstaat and the Rule of Law: historical reflections on the emergence of 
administrative law in Europe’ in S. Rose-Ackerman and P. L. Lindseth (eds), Comparative Administrative 
Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2013) 25. cf A. Venn Dicey, ‘Droit Administratif in Modern French Law’ 
(1901) 17 LQR 302, 307. 
70C. Sumner Lobingier, ‘Administrative Law and Droit Administratif: A Comparative Study with an 
Instructive Model’ (1942) U Penn L Rev 36, 37-39. 
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originally intended that claims against the administration should be judged by the 
administration itself, the separation between justice and administration led to the opposite 
result 71  as a separate body of courts developed to review such acts. 72  With the 
development of this separate system of administrative courts came the development of a 
droit administratif, whereby the activities of the state were subjected to legal principles 
and norms.73 The French model of administration and administrative law then effectively 
emerged as the prevailing system of administration on the European continent.74  
 
Like France, Germany also has a long tradition of administrative law, albeit that the 
emergence of administrative law in the Germanic tradition was the result of evolution 
rather than revolution. 75  During the nineteenth century, German liberals strove to 
establish legal structures to limit the unfettered exercise of state power by the monarchs 
of the various German states.76 The idea of Rechtsstaat was therefore constructed in order 
to reconcile the freedom of action of the State with the rights of the citizen and it gave 
birth to administrative law having the task of setting legal boundaries to central 
administration.77 This development was ‘perfected’ by the creation of a separate system 
                                                        
71J. Massot, ‘The Powers and Duties of the French Administrative Judge’ in S. Rose-Ackerman and P. L. 
Lindseth (eds), Comparative Administrative Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2013) 415. 
72L. Duguit, ‘The French Administrative Courts’ (1914) 29 Political Science Quarterly 385, 407.  
73ibid 407. 
74n 69 above, 28.  
75ibid.  
76G. Nolte, ‘General Principles of German and European Administrative Law - A Comparison in Historical 
Perspective’ (1994) 57 MLR 191, 198.  
77R. Gosalbo-Bono, ‘The Significance of the Rule of Law and its Implications for the European Union and 
the United States’ (2010) 72 U Pittsburgh L Rev 229, 241.  
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of administrative law courts through which substantive principles of administrative law 
were developed.78  
 
Thus, in France and Germany (and much of continental Europe), review of administrative 
action came to be placed outside of the purview of ordinary courts which gave rise to a 
self-conscious divide between public and private law. However, in England, it was only 
during the course of the twentieth century and because of the growth of a more centralised 
government that a distinct discipline of administrative law started to emerge.79 Until well 
into the nineteenth century, the English administrative apparatus had developed on a case-
by-case basis focusing on certain aspects of public life, such as regulation of work, 
railways, health, public education and poor relief,80 with authority being assigned to the 
body which experience had shown best fitted to perform the work in question.81 For the 
same reasons, administrative review was performed by ordinary courts rather than by 
separate administrative courts.82 While the emergence of a more centralised form of 
government in England resulted in the creation of independent tribunals to hear appeals 
from decisions of certain administrative bodies and governmental departments, the 
adjudication of a large number of disputes involving public bodies still remained within 
the purview of the ordinary courts. In addition, the function of such tribunals has been 
                                                        
78K. F. Ledford, ‘Formalising the Rule of Law in Prussia: the Supreme Administrative Law Court 1876-
1914’ (2004) 37 Central European History 203, 204.  
79A. Venn Dicey, ‘The Development of Administrative Law in England’ (1915) 31 LQR 148, 149. 
80n 69 above, 31.  
81J. Willis, ‘Three Approaches to Administrative Law: The Judicial, the Conceptual, and the Functional’ 
(1935) 1 U Toronto L J 53, 75. 
82n 69 above, 32.  
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conceptualised as essentially judicial (as opposed to administrative) in nature. 83 
Similarly, although the administrative division of the High Court handles judicial review 
applications, this court constitutes a specialised ordinary (or judicial) court, which 
‘operates inside the framework of the unitary legal system to which it remains firmly 
attached’.84 
 
The distinct approach taken under English law to the private-public law divide has also 
been significantly influenced by the lack of a written UK constitution and the resulting 
uncertainty as to the constitution’s content.85 In particular, the loose, largely convention-
based, nature of UK constitutional law has made it difficult for English administrative 
law to develop in a coherent manner.86 In addition, the primacy of the rule of law within 
the UK constitutional system has served to shape the views of those (such as Albert Venn 
Dicey) who have argued that no distinction is required under English law between private 
and public law. Indeed, the influence of Dicey’s views is such that they can be considered 
to constitute a separate factor contributing to the view that a public-private law distinction 
                                                        
83Report of the Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries, Cmnd 218, (1957) at [40];  Report 
of the Review of Tribunals by Sir A. Leggatt, Tribunals for Users: One System, One Service (TSO 2001); 
Department for Constitutional Affairs, Transforming Public Services, Complaints, Redress and Tribunals, 
Cmn 6243 (2004). See also J. Boughey, ‘Administrative law: the next frontier for comparative law’ (2013) 
67 ICLQ 55, 67. 
84C. Harlow and R. Rawlings, Law and Administration (3rd edn, Cambridge University Press 2009) 19. 
85See generally E. Barendt, ‘Is there a United Kingdom Constitution?’ (1997) 17 OJLS 137. See also House 
of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, ‘A new Magna Carta?: Second Report of 
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does not form part of English law. 87  Dicey was suspicious of the very concept of 
administrative or public law and argued that English law, in general, subjects citizens and 
officials to the same rules of ordinary common law and that the rule of law, which he 
regarded as a private law concept from which Britain’s unwritten constitution was 
derived, 88  was sufficient to keep in check administrative power and governmental 
discretion.  
 
Admittedly, the distinction between public and private law (and the concept of 
administrative law in particular) has become increasingly significant in English law, 
which can largely be attributed to the rapid development since the 1960s of the law 
relating to judicial review of administrative action.89 Fundamentally however, the idea of 
an autonomous body of public law rules extraneous to the common law remains a ‘cuckoo 
in the nest’.90  
 
This lack of a well-embedded distinction between public and private law could, somewhat 
paradoxically, have assisted English law in responding to the increasing 
contractualisation of government over the last forty years and, more importantly, to the 
                                                        
87C. Harlow, ‘“Public” and “Private” Law: Definition Without Distinction (1980) 43 MLR 241; J. Beatson, 
‘“Public” and “Private” in English administrative law (1987) 103 LQR 34. 
88A. Venn Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (8th edn, London, 1915; reprint 
ed., Indianapolis, 1982; 1st ed., London, 1885), 107-122 and 202-203. 
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27 
 
hybrid legal phenomena which have resulted from such contractualisation, such as public-
private contracts and public-private arbitrations. However, while English law has evolved 
to take account of these phenomena, this evolution has not been an unqualified success. 
Thus, while initially the English courts applied a ‘source’ based test in holding that public 
law applied only to the decisions of authorities which derived their power from statute or 
prerogative,91 the decision of the Court of Appeal in R v Panel on Take-Overs and 
Mergers, ex p Datafin92 marked a move to a ‘functional’ based test. In Datafin, the Court 
of Appeal held that the nature of the functions of an entity, and in particular whether that 
entity has a ‘public element’93 or is under some ‘public duty’,94 rather than just the formal 
source of its powers, must be taken into account.95  The Datafin test therefore aimed to 
adapt the principles of judicial review to modern government practices and, in particular, 
the exercise of public power and performance of public functions by private parties.96 
Consistent application of the test has, however, proven difficult 97  and it has been 
described as being ‘singularly difficult to apply with any degree of certainty’.98  
                                                        
91n 89 above, 47-50. 
92[1987] 2 WLR 699. 
93ibid 715. 
94ibid 714. 
95See J. Beatson, ‘Which Regulatory Bodies are Subject to the Human Rights Act?’ in J. Beatson  (ed), The 
Human Rights Act and the Criminal Justice and Regulatory Process (Hart Publishing 1999) 101 for an 
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The manner in which English law has defined the boundaries between administrative law 
and contract law can, consistent with the differing manner in which they conceptualise 
the public-private law divide more generally, be contrasted to the approach taken in other 
European states.99 For example, under French law, the jurisdiction of the administrative 
courts does not depend on whether an authority is exercising a statutory or prerogative 
power or whether it has a ‘public element’, but is instead based on the notion of public 
service and crucially the notion of public interest, namely whether the body whose actions 
are disputed was ‘set up in the public interest to carry out a public service function’.100 
Thus, service of the public interest is regarded as the foundational principle of French 
administrative law and, therefore, as the litmus test for defining not only the ultimate 
purpose of the public administration but also for delimiting its permissible scope of 
action.101 This means that administrative action and entities in charge of a service public 
are generally governed by specific provisions which differ from private law.102 A contract 
will therefore be dealt with by the administrative courts where it relates to a public service 
duty, where it contains a clause that is not typical of a private contract or where it is 
categorised by the law as an administrative contract.103 Where a contract falls within these 
                                                        
99J.B. Auby, ‘Comparative Approaches to the Rise of Contract in the Public Sphere’ [2007] PL 40, 47-48. 
100J. Bell, ‘Administrative Law’ in J. Bell, S. Boyron and S. Whittaker, Principles of French Law (2nd edn, 
Oxford University Press 2008) 172. 
101G. Merland, ‘L'intérêt général, instrument efficace de protection des droits fondamentaux?’ (2004) 16 
Les Cahiers du Conseil constitutionnel 155, 155.  
102See R. Geiger, ‘The Unilateral Change of Economic Development Agreements’ (1974) 23 ICLQ 73, 95-
99. 
103J. Arnould, ‘French public contracts law after the reform of March 2001’ (2001) PPLR 324, 335-336. 
See also A. Davies, The Public Law of Government Contracts (Oxford University Press 2008) 55-58. 
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parameters, a separate body of procedural and substantive rules of administrative law is 
applied by the administrative courts, supported by a strong jurisprudence ensuring that 
the contract meets social needs.104 In particular, even in the absence of any stipulation in 
the contract (or even if the contract states to the contrary), the public authority may always 
terminate the contract unilaterally and on the grounds of the general interest. Further, the 
principle of the adaptability of the public service means the public authority can oblige 
the private service provider to adapt the service or to terminate the contract. Finally, to 
ensure continuity of service in all circumstances, drastic changes in the conditions of 
performance of an administrative contract confer the right on the service provider to ask 
for a specific indemnity or, where appropriate, to increase its charges to consumers.105 
This focus on the public interest as the core principle of administrative law has also 
prevailed in those administrative law systems influenced by French law, such as Belgium, 
Greece, Luxembourg, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Turkey.106 
 
In contrast, in England, while legislation exists which allows for statutory powers to be 
conferred on private parties,107 there is an absence of legislation or case law laying down 
                                                        
104T. Posser, Law and the Regulators (Clarendon Press 1997) 287. See also C. Donnelly, ‘Public-Private 
Partnerships: Award, Performance and Remedies’ in S.W. Schill (ed), International Investment Law and 
Comparative Public Law (Oxford University Press 2010) 491-493. 
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analogous principles to ensure that public-private contracts meet social needs.108 As a 
result, concerns such as those relating to the adaptability of the contract or continuity of 
service must instead be addressed through contractual provisions (ie by private law 
means). 109  Thus, the manner in which the public-private law divide has been 
conceptualised in England does take account not of the hybrid nature of public-private 
contracts or of public-private arbitrations and has not been conducive to the development 
of a distinct legal and conceptual framework for public-private arbitration.  
 
The second, related, reason to which the underdeveloped conception of public-private 
arbitration in England can be attributed is that arbitration in England has traditionally 
been embedded in private law and developed as an exclusively private mode of dispute 
resolution. English merchants and guilds have been using arbitration since the Middle 
Ages, mainly because the royal courts were deemed ill-suited to deal with commercial 
disputes.110 Arbitration in England was therefore conceived, designed and developed over 
the course of more than four centuries to accommodate contractual disputes between 
private parties, typically disputes arising out of maritime and sales of goods transactions 
                                                        
108C. Harlow and R. Rawlings, Law and Administration (3rd edn, Cambridge University Press 2009) 343-
345. 
109See P. Craig, ‘Contracting Out, the Human Rights Act and the Scope of Judicial Review’ (2002) 118 
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or construction projects.111 By the time public entities started to enter into contracts 
including arbitration clauses in the late twentieth century, the private character of 
arbitration law was well crystallised. Accordingly, the resolution of disputes involving 
public law and public entities was effectively shoehorned into a dispute resolution 
framework which had been operating as an entirely private mode of dispute resolution for 
a very long time. The result is that the significant expansion of the scope of judicial review 
of administrative action over the last 50 years has left undisturbed the private law 
paradigm on which arbitration is based. 
 
VII. Does English arbitration law adequately protect the public interest in public-
private arbitrations? 
 
While administrative law scholars are familiar with the tension between public and 
private law norms in the context of the resolution of public-private disputes before 
English courts,112 the issues arising from such tension within the setting of private dispute 
resolution, such as arbitration, are both uncharted and exacerbated. As we submit, the 
private law paradigm upon which English arbitration law is based leaves the public 
interest both unaccounted for, and unprotected, in public-private arbitrations.  
Specifically, the primacy afforded to the principle of party autonomy will typically 
prevent the English courts from intervening in public-private arbitrations, even when 
issues of public interest may arise.  For example, while an application may be brought by 
                                                        
111ibid. See also G. B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration (2nd edn, Kluwer Law International 
2014) 34-38. 
112 See for example J. W. F. Allison, A Continental Distinction in the Common Law: a Historical and 
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a party to the courts under section 45 of the 1996 Act for the determination of ‘any 
question of law arising in the course of proceedings’ and while such applications may 
bring points of law of general interest before the courts,113 the scope of this section is 
subject to several limitations, including the fact that the arbitration tribunal itself may not 
refer a question of law for determination.114  
 
Similarly, while the possibility for court review of the arbitration process under sections 
67 to 69 of 1996 Act is intended to act as a public policy safeguard to some extent, the 
threshold for court intervention is set at a high level. Furthermore, the 1996 Act does not 
reference in any guise the concept of public interest as a possible ground for challenging 
an award nor does the case law in this area. Instead, the case law generally emphasises 
the deference that should be afforded to the arbitration process and confines itself to the 
specific grounds for challenge enumerated under sections 67 to 69.115 
 
In addition, while certain elements of the law of arbitration are not encompassed within 
the parameters of the 1996 Act and are subject to common law principles, 116 
jurisprudence in those areas has, to date, failed to develop a coherent account of how the 
public interest may interact with the arbitration process. For example, under English law, 
arbitrability is a broad concept with few prescriptive rules as to its scope and 
                                                        
113Departmental Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law, ‘1996 Report on the Arbitration Bill’ (Chairman 
The Rt Hon Lord Justice Saville) (1997) 13 Arbitration Int’l 275 at [218]. 
114For further detail see Section VIII below. 
115See for example The Secretary of State for the Home Department v Raytheon Systems Limited [2014] 
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application.117 Instead, the English courts have approached the question of whether or not 
a particular dispute is arbitrable on a case-by-case basis, considering whether:  
 
the matters in dispute…engage third party rights or represent an attempt to delegate 
to the arbitrators what is a matter of public interest which cannot be determined 
within the limitations of a private contractual process.118  
 
However, Longmore LJ’s judgment confirmed that what is considered a matter of public 
interest in this context is narrow in scope: ‘[t]o the extent therefore that public policy has 
a part to play it can only be a “safeguard . . . necessary in the public interest”. This is a 
demanding test…’.119  
 
Similarly, the common law recognises that it is an implied term of arbitration that the 
parties’ desire for confidentiality and privacy generally outweighs the public interest in a 
public hearing. 120  This obligation of confidentiality also applies to any documents 
prepared for the arbitration, or disclosed or produced in the course of the arbitration and 
to transcripts or notes of the evidence in the arbitration.121 It also generally applies to the 
arbitral award itself, save that disclosure of the award in separate proceedings to enforce 
                                                        
117See generally J. D. M. Lew and O. Marsden, ‘Arbitrability’ in J. D. M. Lew, H. Bor, et al (eds.), 
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or protect the legal rights of a party to the arbitration agreement may be permissible.122 A 
number of exceptions to this general principle of confidentiality have developed,123 
including exceptions allowing for disclosure where it is required in the interests of justice 
or in the public interest.124 However, while these exceptions could potentially be of 
particular relevance in the context of public-private arbitration, the public interest-based 
exception is not well-established under English law.125 In addition, in delineating the 
scope of such exceptions, the English courts have not distinguished between public-
private arbitration and private arbitrations. This means that, even in respect of public-
private disputes with clear public interest implications, confidentiality remains the default 
rule.126  
 
Finally, it is often argued that any public interest concerns with regard to arbitration 
awards can be addressed at the conclusion of the arbitration process when English courts 
may refuse to recognise or enforce a domestic or international arbitration award where it 
would be contrary to English public policy to do so.127 However, the public policy ground 
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under English arbitration law has generally been narrowly construed.128  For example, the 
Court of Appeal has stated that, in order for enforcement of an award to be contrary to 
public policy, there would have to be some element of illegality or if the underlying 
contract or activity violates principles of public policy which are ‘of the greatest 
importance’. 129   Finally, while the public policy ground has, to date, largely been 
considered in the context of arbitration awards rendered in disputes between private 
parties, there is no indication that the English courts would expand its scope where public-
private arbitrations are concerned.  
 
Therefore, while the concept of the public interest has, at times, been touched upon in 
arbitration case law, there is little indication that the public interest concerns that arise in 
the context of public-private arbitration are capable of being addressed within the existing 
private law understanding of arbitration under English law. This exclusively private law 
approach, endorsed by the legislature and judiciary, is reinforced by the manner in which 
arbitrators perceive their role. While the function and training of national judges is 
directed at serving the interests of the public and while judges are, particularly in public 
law cases, required to have regard to the broader societal implications of their 
judgments,130 arbitrators (who are typically private lawyers) and who are appointed and 
paid by the parties may perceive their role and function as more akin to a service provider 
                                                        
128See generally A. Sheppard and S. Brekoulakis, Policies and Public Policy in English Arbitration Law 
(Oxford University Press 2017 forthcoming). 
129Westacre Investments Inc v Jugoimport-SDPR Holding Co Ltd [1999] EWCA Civ 1401. See also 
Soleimany v Soleimany [1998] EWCA Civ 285. 
130See A. Chayes, ‘The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation’ (1975-1976) 89 Harv L Rev 1281. 
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whose mandate comes from a private contract and who is responsible for resolving the 
dispute between the parties rather than protecting the public interest.131  
 
These factors have all contributed to a conceptual and legal disconnect as between the 
private law sphere of arbitration and the public law sphere of administrative law. This 
disconnect exists despite the close connection that has been established by case law in 
other contexts between matters of public interest and the scope of public law. For 
example, in Re McBride’s Application, Kerr J stated that ‘an issue is one of public law 
where it involves a matter of public interest in the sense that it has an impact on the public 
generally’ and where it ‘affect[s] the public’ in particular.132  
 
This conceptual and legal disconnect is best illustrated by contrasting the narrow scope 
of review of arbitration awards by English courts with the approach taken by the English 
courts in respect of the judicial review of administrative action. Judicial review of 
administrative action in England, at least in its modern guise, has a substantially broad 
scope.133 In particular, since the House of Lords’ decision in Anisminic Ltd v Foreign 
Compensation Commission 134  the scope of judicial review has been significantly 
broadened so that virtually all errors of law, including jurisdictional and non-
                                                        
131P. Hodges and J. Greenaway, ‘Duties of Arbitrators’ in J. D. M.  Lew, H. Bor, et al (eds), Arbitration in 
England, with chapters on Scotland and Ireland, (Kluwer Law International 2013) at [15.49]-[15.52]. See 
also M. R. Baniassadi, ‘Do Mandatory Rules of Public Law Limit Choice of Law in International 
Commercial Arbitration’ (1992) 10 Berkeley J Int’l L 59, 83. 
132[1999] NI 299, 310. See also R v Legal Aid Board, ex p Donn [1996] 3 All ER 1, 11. 
133J. Beatson, ‘“Public” and “Private” in English administrative law (1987) 103 LQR 34. See generally C. 
Harlow and R. Rawlings, Law and Administration (3rd edn, Cambridge University Press 2009) ch 3. 
134[1969] 2 AC 147. 
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jurisdictional ones, are reviewable.135 Crucially, the concept of error of law is broader 
than a mistake in the interpretation of a statute as, typically, the English courts tend to 
characterise all inferences from primary facts as questions of law.136 Thus, a public body 
will commit an error of law if it acts where there is no evidence to support the action or 
comes to a conclusion to which, on the evidence, it could not reasonably have come.137 
Similarly, while public bodies are accorded discretionary powers when choosing between 
several decisions or courses of action, courts will supervise a decision in terms of whether 
the public body has, intentionally or inadvertently, unlawfully exercised its discretion, 
albeit the court will not substitute its own decision for the decision made by the public 
body.138 Finally, and significantly, the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998 has 
had broad implications for administrative law, including the introduction of new rules of 
statutory interpretation, and the requirement that public authorities act consistently with 
Convention rights, which has to some extent expanded the scope of judicial review, not 
least through the introduction of proportionality as the test of substantive view where 
Convention rights are at issue.139 While the low-intensity irrationality review140 which 
applies under the well-established Wednesbury test141 ensures that courts do not interfere 
                                                        
135Re Racal Communications Ltd [1981] AC 374, 383; R v Lord President of the Privy Council, ex p Page 
[1993] 2 AC 682. See also B. Gould, ‘Anisminic and Judicial Review' [1970] PL 358, 365.  
136J. Beatson, ‘The Scope of Judicial Review for Error of Law’ (1984) 4 OJLS 22, 39-44. See also C. 
Harlow and R. Rawlings, Law and Administration (3rd edn, Cambridge University Press 2009) 511-513. 
137ibid 30. See also Railtrack Plc v Guinness Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 188 at [51]. 
138Padfield v Minister of Agriculture [1968] AC 997, 1030. See also A. W. Bradley, K. W. Ewing and C. 
J. S. Knight, Constitutional & Administrative Law (16th edn, Pearson 2014) 636.  
139T. Poole, ‘The Reformation of English Administrative Law’ (2009) 68 CLJ 142, 144-148. 
140See generally E. C. Ip, ‘Taking a ‘Hard Look’ at ‘Irrationality’: Substantive Review of Administrative 
Discretion in the US and UK Supreme Courts’ (2014) 34 OJLS 481. 
141Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation [1947] EWCA Civ 1.  
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lightly with the substance of administrative decisions, judicial review is nonetheless 
notably broader than the review of arbitration awards by English courts.    
 
Resolution of public-private disputes within this private law framework gives rise to a 
number of potential threats to the public interest. While not exhaustive of the possible 
ways in which public-private arbitration may conflict with fundamental public law 
norms,142 two threats will, in particular, be elaborated upon to illustrate the conceptual 
and legal void in respect of how public interest is accounted for in public-private 
arbitration.  
 
The first possible threat arising out of the private resolution of public-private disputes is 
associated with the likely non-application of public law norms, including administrative 
law doctrines. Due to the hybrid nature of public-private contracts, the legal regime 
applicable to such contracts consists of both private law and certain public law rules and, 
therefore, public-private disputes may give rise to conflicts between private and public 
law. Let us assume, for example, that in the E-Borders case, the UK government had 
decided, in the light of new developments on immigration and security (for example the 
recent influx of immigrants and refugees from conflict zones and terrorist attacks in 
Europe), to significantly amend the specifications for the e-border system, or alternatively 
                                                        
142For example, the fact that third parties are generally not permitted to intervene in arbitration proceedings 
(unless the parties otherwise agree) can be considered problematic in the context of public-private 
arbitration. This contrasts with judicial review proceedings in which third parties are permitted to intervene 
and put forward public interest-related arguments: see Public Law Project, ‘Third Party Interventions in 
Judicial Review: an action research study’ (2001); A. Asteriti and C. J. Tams, ‘Transparency and 
Representation of the Public Interest in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ in S.W. Schill (ed), International 
Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (Oxford University Press 2010) 801-803. 
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to cancel the contract altogether with a view to reconsidering UK immigration and border 
policy.  
 
In such circumstances, the government’s conduct would likely give rise to a dispute 
prompting the contractor to commence arbitration. This would almost certainly implicate 
the fundamental question of whether a contract may preclude a government from 
implementing important governmental policies, which would bring into play 
administrative law doctrines such as the ultra vires doctrine and the rule against fettering. 
The ultra vires doctrine reflects public law’s concern with democratic accountability by 
requiring the government’s actions to be authorised by elected representatives of the 
people.143 The rule against fettering constitutes an application of the ultra vires principle 
and provides that, where a statute confers a discretionary power on a public body to act 
in the public interest, it is not permissible for that public body to put itself in a position in 
which it will not be able to exercise its discretion.144 This rule affords the government the 
ability to change its policies in order to reflect the will of the people (particularly after a 
change in government) or to reflect new circumstances (such as the new developments in 
immigration and security described above). 145  This could result in a public body 
disrupting a public-private contract to pursue a competing public interest goal.146 
 
                                                        
143See generally A. C. L. Davies, ‘Ultra vires problems in government contracts’ (2006) 122 LQR 98.  
144See British Oxygen Co Ltd v Board of Trade [1971] AC 610. See also C. Hilson, ‘Judicial Review, 
Policies and the Fettering of Discretion’ [2002] PL 111. 
145n 143 above, 105.  
146See for example HM Treasury, Standardisation of PFI Contracts (4th edn, 2007) at [1.4.5] which 
recognises the possibility of conflict between contractual obligations and the rule against fettering.   
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Of course, this tension between public and private law norms can arise whenever a dispute 
arises under a public-private contract and is not unique to public-private arbitration.147 
However, while courts in the common law tradition are required to take judicial notice of 
the public laws of their own State, without a need for such laws to be specifically pleaded 
or proved, 148  it is questionable whether this is the case in respect of arbitration 
tribunals.149 Instead, arbitrators tend to take a predominately or exclusively private law 
approach to such disputes. Finally, the risk that mandatory rules of public law150 are not 
considered in public-private arbitrations is further heightened by the narrow scope of 
review of arbitration awards by the English courts and by the lack of an arbitrator-driven 
mechanism for referring questions on points of law to the courts.  
 
To illustrate this, in Cory v London Corporation, 151  the public authority (London 
Corporation), in its capacity as a sanitary authority, entered into a waste collection 
                                                        
147 See generally A. Davies, The Public Law of Government Contracts (Oxford University Press 2008) ch 
6. 
148P. Capper, ‘‘Proving’ the Contents of the Applicable Substantive Law(s)’ in F. Bortolotti and P. Mayer 
(eds), The Application of Substantive Law by International Arbitrators (Kluwer Law International 2014) 
39. 
149See J. D. M. Lew, ‘The Basis for Applying Competition Law from an English Law Perspective’ in G. 
Blanke and P. Landolt (eds), EU and US Antitrust Arbitration: A Handbook for Practitioners (Kluwer Law 
International 2011) at [14-026]-[14-029]; A. Sheppard, ‘Mandatory Rules in International Commercial 
Arbitration – An English Law Perspective’ (2007) 18 Am Rev Int'l Arb 121, 144-145. 
150For a definition of mandatory rules of law see D. F. Donovan, ‘The Relevance (or Lack Thereof) of the 
Notion of “Mandatory Rules of Law” to Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2007) 18 Am Rev Int'l Arb 205, 
205. See also M. R. Baniassadi, ‘Do Mandatory Rules of Public Law Limit Choice of Law in International 
Commercial Arbitration’ (1992) 10 Berkeley J Int’l L 59, 69. 
151[1951] 2 KB 476.   
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contract with a private contractor. Subsequently, London Corporation, in its capacity as 
port health authority, changed its by-laws with the aim of improving hygiene standards. 
Such amendment rendered the contract unprofitable for the contractor. The waste 
collection contract contained an arbitration clause and the contractor referred the dispute 
to arbitration claiming a declaration that it was no longer bound by the (more onerous) 
contract. Given the public law aspects of the dispute, the arbitrator referred a question of 
law to the courts. Taking English public law into account, the Court of Appeal refused to 
imply into the contract a term that the contract would not be made more onerous (on the 
basis that such a clause would be ultra vires) and held that London Corporation was under 
a duty to make the by-laws regardless of their impact on its contracting partner and that 
the making of the by-laws did not constitute a breach or a repudiation of the contract.152 
Crucially however, the reference to the English courts was only possible because the 
dispute was decided under the Arbitration Act 1950, section 21 of which was a mandatory 
provision which specified a ‘stated case’ appellate procedure. 153 However, the 1996 Act 
does not provide for such a procedure (indeed, it has not been a feature of English 
arbitration law since 1979).154 In addition, as described above, both sections 45 and 
section 69 of the 1996 Act are frequently contracted out off and their scope is subject to 
several limitations. Therefore, as there is currently no arbitrator-driven mechanism for 
referring questions on points of law to the courts and no appellate procedure for disputes 
                                                        
152n 143 above, 105-110. See also Dowty Boulton Paul Ltd v Wolverhampton Corporation [1971] WLR 
204. 
153Section 21(1) provides as follows: ‘An arbitrator or umpire may, and shall if so directed by the High 
Court, state- (a) any question of law arising in the course of the reference; or (b) an award or any part of an 
award, in the form of a special case for the decision of the High Court.’ 
154See generally Lord Hacking, ‘The “Stated Case” Abolished: The United Kingdom Arbitration Act of 
1979’ (1980) 14 Int Lawyer 95.  
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implicating public law, it is likely that the Cory dispute would nowadays not have been 
referred to, or substantively reviewed by, the English courts under the 1996 Act. 
Furthermore, if the matter were to come before the courts in the course of setting aside or 
enforcement proceedings, the restrictive approach taken by the English courts to date in 
respect of the public policy ground would preclude consideration of administrative law 
doctrines. 
 
The second possible threat identified is the threat to the fundamental public law norms of 
openness and accountability.155 This threat arises as the details of the dispute before an 
arbitration tribunal, the conduct of arbitration and the final award are generally private 
and confidential.156 As public bodies are given their powers on the basis that they are to 
be exercised in the public interest, the public has an interest in ensuring such powers are 
not abused. However, this objective cannot be achieved where the public law norms of 
openness and accountability are not applied.157 This rationale applies as equally to the 
powers exercised by public bodies in respect of public-private contracts as to any other 
power, given the potential impact of contracting out on the public158 and given that 
public-private contracts have, to some extent, replaced legislative commands as the 
                                                        
155C. Harlow and R. Rawlings, Law and Administration (3rd edn, Cambridge University Press 2009) 46-47. 
156This point has been discussed in the field of investment treaty arbitration and in the context of the 
‘contracting out’ of public functions: see for example G. Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and 
Public Law (Oxford University Press 2007) ch 7; G. Borrie, ‘The Regulation of Public and Private Power’ 
[1989] PL 552.  
157R (on the application of Molinaro) v Kensington and Chelsea RLBC [2001] EWHC Admin 896 at [67].  
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paradigm of public administration and regulation.159 As these types of disputes have 
repercussions for taxpayers and may affect the implementation of important 
governmental policies, it is in the interest of the public that these disputes, and the 
outcome of these disputes, become known to the public, and that the public body and its 
responsible officers are held accountable.160  
 
In the E-Borders case,161 for example, the arbitration proceedings were conducted in 
private and the arbitration award, including the details of the contractor’s claims and the 
names of the arbitrators, remain confidential. Similarly, the details of a recent dispute 
between the National Health Service and Fujitsu in respect of the cancellation of an £896 
million IT contract, which was submitted to arbitration, remain confidential, although 
industry reports claim that the dispute was settled in favour of Fujitsu.162 By keeping these 
types of public-private disputes and their resolution private and confidential, the public 
is deprived of the opportunity to consider ‘what went wrong’ and to attribute 
accountability to either the public body (in which case political accountability should 
ensue) or to the private party (in which case civil liability should follow). 163 Thus, as 
recently noted by Lord Chief Justice Thomas, while open court proceedings ‘enable 
                                                        
159M. Hunt, ‘Constitutionalism and the Contractualisation of Government in the United Kingdom’ in M. 
Taggart (ed.), The Province of Administrative Law (Hart Publishing 1997) 21. See also T. Daintith, 
‘Regulation by contract: The new prerogative’ (1979) 32 CLP 41, 41-42. 
160 A. Davies, The Public Law of Government Contracts (Oxford University Press 2008) 227. 
161See Section III above. 
162See S. Cameron, ‘Oh dear, is this another costly IT failure?: Taxpayers deserve to know why Whitehall 
computer contracts keep going wrong’ The Telegraph (London, 24 July 2014).  
163J. Freeman, ‘The Contracting State’ (2000-2001) 28 Fla St U L Rev 155, 200. 
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people to watch, debate, develop, contest, and materialize the exercise of both public and 
private power’, arbitration does not do so.164  
 
VIII. Proposals to reform English arbitration law to take account of the public 
interest  
 
The previous sections demonstrated that there is a conceptual and legal void in respect of 
how the public interest is protected in public-private arbitration under English law. This 
section puts forward proposals to reform English arbitration law, with particular focus on 
addressing the two threats to the public interest identified in Section VII. These 
suggestions do not include the removal of public-private disputes from the arbitral sphere 
entirely. The collapse of the non-arbitrability doctrine, the preponderance of arbitration 
clauses in public-private contracts and the established policy of English law favouring 
arbitration mean that it is neither practical nor desirable that arbitrators would be 
precluded from hearing disputes under public-private contracts. Furthermore, to deprive 
public bodies of the opportunity to enjoy the notable advantages of arbitration over 
litigation in terms of speed and flexibility could, of itself, have adverse implications for 
public welfare.  
 
The main thrust of our proposals is that the existing legal framework of English arbitration 
law should be revised to, first, allow for more extensive court involvement in public-
private arbitrations and, second, to restrict the application of the confidentiality principle. 
                                                        
164Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, ‘Developing commercial law 
through the courts: rebalancing the relationship between the courts and arbitration’, The Bailii Lecture 
2016, 9 March 2016 at [49]. 
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Implementing these proposals will require the English legislature and judiciary to 
introduce a distinction between the legal treatment of purely commercial arbitrations and 
public-private arbitrations and, in respect of the latter, to restrict the application of the 
‘contractual’ or private law understanding of arbitration.  
 
We turn first to the suggestion of amending the existing statutory framework to allow for 
a more extensive court involvement in public-private arbitrations to ensure that 
fundamental public law norms are considered. It is submitted that such intervention 
should be directed at providing determinations on questions of public law and should be 
available at two stages, namely during the course of an arbitration and at its conclusion. 
Thus, during the course of arbitral proceedings, the ability to apply to the courts for a 
preliminary determination of a point of law should be expanded in respect of public-
private disputes. While, under section 45 of the 1996 Act, an application for a 
determination on any question of law may currently be made during the course of arbitral 
proceedings, several limitations apply to the scope of this section. In particular, the parties 
may agree in advance not to bring such applications and, even where the possibility of 
bringing such applications has not been excluded, the application may only be brought at 
a party’s initiative. Furthermore, unless all of the parties to the arbitration agree to the 
making of such an application, before such application may be considered, under section 
45(2)(b), the arbitration tribunal must grant its permission and the court must be satisfied 
that both the determination of the question is likely to produce substantial savings in costs 
and that the application was made without delay. For these reasons, section 45 has, to 
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date, rarely been used.165  In addition, while, historically, arbitrators enjoyed the ability 
to refer a question of law to the English courts,166 an arbitrator, who should observe the 
mandatory laws of the chosen law,167 currently cannot apply of his or her own initiative 
to the English courts for an authoritative determination on a point of English public law, 
even where the arbitrator in question has no legal training or no training in English law 
in particular. Particularly in respect of public-private arbitrations, the current position 
under English law thus seems an unwarranted overcorrection.  
 
A new subsection should therefore be inserted into section 45 of the 1996 Act which, in 
respect of public-private arbitrations, would permit applications to be made by either a 
party to the arbitral proceedings or by the arbitral tribunal referring a point of public law 
for determination to the English courts. This subsection should be expressed to be without 
prejudice to the existing ability of parties to arbitral proceedings to refer questions of law 
to the courts under section 45(1) for commercial arbitrations and should include 
definitions of the terms ‘public-private arbitral proceedings’ and ‘public body’.168 The 
                                                        
165R. Merkin and L. Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996 (5th edn, informa law 2014) 200. See Beegas Nominees 
v Decco Ltd [2003] EWHC 1891 (Ch); Taylor Woodrow Holdings Ltd v Barnes & Elliott Ltd [2006] EWHC 
1693 (TCC); Secretary of State for Defence v Turner Estate Solutions Limited [2015] EWHC 1150 (TCC). 
166See B.J. Conrick, ‘“Where the Kings Writ does not run”: The Origins and Effects of the Arbitration Act 
1979 (1985) 12 QUT Law Rev 1, 2 and 12. 
167M. Blessing, ‘Mandatory Rules of Law versus Party Autonomy in International Arbitration’ (1997) 14 J 
Int’l Arb 23, 27. 
168The term ‘public law’ has not been defined in English legislation to date and it is therefore not proposed 
to define it for these purposes. However, a definition of the term ‘question of public law’ should be included 
in section 82(1) of the 1996 Act, which, consistent with the definition of the term ‘question of law’ would 
state that the term means ‘(a) for a court in England and Wales, a question of the public law of England and 
Wales, and (b) for a court in Northern Ireland, a question of the public law of Northern Ireland’. 
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term ‘public-private arbitral proceedings’ should encompass all arbitral proceedings 
involving a public body and another person who is not a public body and the term ‘public 
body’ should be defined in accordance with the established boundaries of English public 
law so as to encompass not only statutory bodies but also any person or body having 
functions of a public nature.169  
 
The new subsection of section 45 relating to public-private arbitral proceedings should 
also be included in the list of mandatory provisions in Schedule 1 to the 1996 Act so that 
its application may not be excluded by the parties’ contrary agreement. 170  The 
requirement under section 45(1) that the court is satisfied that the question of law 
‘substantially affects the rights or one of more of the parties’ should, it is submitted, also 
apply in respect of the new subsection as to permit an application for a determination on 
a point of law which is inconsequential to the dispute would run contrary to both the 
autonomy of the arbitration process and to the principle of judicial economy. It is also 
submitted that, given the public interest implications involved, the criteria under the 
current section 45(2) should not apply to applications made under the new subsection (ie 
the agreement of both parties should not be required nor should the court need to be 
satisfied that determination of the question is likely to produce substantial savings in costs 
and that the application was made without delay). 
                                                        
  
169A possible definition might read as follows: ‘a State, regional or local authority (including the Crown, 
but not including Her Majesty in her private capacity) and any other person or body having functions of a 
public nature’. The term ‘public body’ or ‘public authority’ has been defined by reference to such public 
functions in other UK legislation: see for example Companies Act 2006, s. 54; The Social Security 
(Miscellaneous Amendments) (No. 4) Regulations 2009, regs 2, 4-9 and 11.  
170 See Arbitration Act 1996, s. 4 and Schedule 1. 
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Turning next to our proposal regarding increased judicial intervention at the conclusion 
of the arbitral process, it is submitted that the existing power of the courts to review 
public-private arbitration awards for errors of law under section 69 of the 1996 Act should 
be expanded. For this purpose, section 69 should be amended in a manner similar to that 
proposed in respect of section 45 to draw a distinction between commercial arbitrations 
and public-private arbitrations. Therefore, it is submitted that section 69(1), which 
codified criteria developed by the courts in the context of commercial disputes,171 should 
continue to apply in respect of the former and a new subsection should be inserted into 
section 69 of the 1996 Act which, in respect of public-private arbitrations, would permit 
an appeal on a question of public law arising out of, or in connection with, the arbitration. 
Notably, this wording is broader than that under section 69(1), which refers to an appeal 
on ‘a question of law arising out of an award’ and which has been interpreted as meaning 
that the question of law must already have been considered by the arbitration tribunal in 
its award.172 As with section 45, this new subsection should be expressed to be without 
prejudice to the existing ability of parties to arbitral proceedings to refer questions of law 
to the courts under section 69(1) and should be included in the list of mandatory 
provisions in Schedule 1 to the 1996 Act so that, unlike the existing right of appeal under 
                                                        
171See Pioneer Shipping Ltd v. BTP Tioxide Ltd (The Nema) (No.2) [1982] AC 724. See also Lord Thomas 
of Cwmgiedd, Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, ‘Developing commercial law through the courts: 
rebalancing the relationship between the courts and arbitration’, The Bailii Lecture 2016, 9 March 2016 at 
[19]-[20].  
172Marklands Ltd v. Virgin Retail Ltd [2003] EWHC 3428 (Ch). See also Universal Petroleum Co Ltd v. 
Handels und Transport GmbH [1987] 1 WLR 1187. 
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section 69(1), its application may not be excluded by the parties’ contrary agreement.173 
Finally, while leave to appeal should be required in respect of applications under the new 
subsection (where all of the parties have not agreed to the appeal being brought), not all 
of the conditions specified in section 69(3) for leave to appeal to be granted should apply. 
Thus, while for the same reasons as outlined above in respect of section 45(1), the 
requirement under section 69(3)(a) that ‘the determination of the question…substantially 
affect[s] the rights of one or more of the parties’ should be included in the test for leave 
to appeal for public-private arbitrations, the requirement under section 69(3)(b) that the 
‘question is one which the tribunal was asked to determine’ should not be applied as the 
parties should not have the power to exclude application of public law rules by not 
bringing such matters before the tribunal.  
 
Turning to section 69(3)(c), it is submitted that neither of the alternative tests of 
correctness specified in that subsection should be applied in determining whether to grant 
leave to appeal a public-private arbitration award. First, the test under the current section 
69(3)(c)(i), which requires the applicant to demonstrate that the decision of the tribunal 
was ‘obviously wrong’, is too narrow to address the public interest implications 
associated with public-private arbitrations as it requires that the alleged error be quickly 
and easily demonstrable. 174  While the alternative test under section 69(3)(c)(ii), in 
requiring that the question is one of general public importance and the decision of the 
tribunal is at least open to serious doubt, is potentially less onerous, it has principally been 
                                                        
173 It is notable that section 87 of the 1996 Act imposes restrictions on the ability of parties to a domestic 
arbitration agreement to exclude the jurisdiction of the courts under section 69 but this section was never 
commenced: see Departmental Advisory Committee, Supplement to the DAC Report on the Arbitration Bill 
of February 1996 (1997) 13 Arbitration Int’l 317 at [47] – [49]. 
174 See AMEC Group Limited v Secretary of State for Defence [2013] EWHC 110. 
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developed in light of the restrictive interpretation of the requirement that the question be 
one ‘of general public importance’ as referring to a question which may arise frequently 
in particular fields of commercial law and which needs to be judicially settled.175 This 
interpretation is, however, unnecessarily restrictive for disputes engaging the public 
interest, the general public importance of which should be assumed. It is thus submitted 
that a new test of correctness should be developed for leave to appeal against public-
private arbitration awards, which would require only that the decision of the tribunal is 
open to doubt. This test would strike an appropriate balance between, on the one hand, 
the finality and autonomy of the arbitral process and, on the other, the public interest in 
reviewing the correct application of fundamental provisions of public law.  
 
Finally, it is submitted that the requirement under section 69(3)(d) that ‘despite the 
agreement of the parties to resolve the matter by arbitration, it is just and proper in all the 
circumstances for the court to determine the question’ should not apply in respect of the 
new right of appeal. Under the existing right to appeal under section 69(1), whether this 
requirement is satisfied has been held by the English courts to be affected by a number of 
factors including the arbitrator’s knowledge of the law176 and whether the respondent can 
show that it would suffer substantial injustice if leave was granted.177 However, such 
factors should not constrain the possibility of an appeal on a point of public law in respect 
of public-private arbitration awards.  
                                                        
175See D. St John Sutton, J. Gill and M. Gearing, Russell on Arbitration (24th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) 
540. See also Pioneer Shipping Ltd v. BTP Tioxide Ltd (The Nema) (No.2) [1982] AC 724, 742-743.  
176 Keydon Estates Ltd v Western Power Distribution (South Wales) Ltd [2004] EWHC 996 (Ch) at [23] - 
[25].   
177HOK Sport Ltd (formerly Lobb Partnership Ltd) v Aintree Racecourse Co Ltd [2002] EWHC 3094 (TCC) 
at [56].  
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Turning to the appropriate scope of courts’ review of public-private arbitration awards 
under this revised statutory framework, this question depends on two interrelated, but 
distinct, issues: first, the issue of whether the issue requiring determination (under section 
45) or the alleged error of an arbitration tribunal (under section 69) involves a ‘question 
of law’ and, secondly, the test that the courts should apply in determining whether an 
arbitration tribunal has erred in law. While the term ‘question of law’ clearly suggests 
that findings of fact are not reviewable by English courts under section 69 of the 1996 
Act, 178 a separate question arises as to whether English courts may review the issue of 
whether there was any evidence to support a tribunal’s factual findings.  
 
While, for commercial arbitrations, a narrow interpretation of the term ‘question of law’ 
which excludes review by the courts of whether or not the evidence supports the factual 
findings of the tribunal has a sound policy and doctrinal basis179 (and is supported by the 
preponderance of case law in the commercial arbitration context),180 it is submitted that 
                                                        
178R. Merkin and L. Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996 (5th edn, informa law 2014) 325-327. 
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See also Departmental Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law, ‘1996 Report on the Arbitration Bill’ 
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Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law, ‘1996 Report on the Arbitration Bill’ (Chairman The Rt Hon 
Lord Justice Saville) (1999) 15 Arbitration Int’l 413 at [286]. 
180See Geogas SA v. Trammo Gas Ltd (The Baleares) [1993] 1 Lloyd's Rep 215, 228; Demco Investments 
& Commercial SA v SE Banken Forsakring Holding AB [2005] EWHC 1398; London Underground Ltd v 
Citylink Telecommunications Ltd [2007] EWHC 1749; House of Fraser Ltd v Scottish Widows Plc [2011] 
EWHC 2800. cf Fence Gate Ltd v NEL Construction Ltd (2001) 82 Con LR 41; Guardcliffe Properties Ltd 
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a broader interpretation of the term, which would permit judicial scrutiny of this issue, is 
warranted for public-private arbitrations. This proposal is supported by Steyn LJ’s dictum 
in Geogas SA v Trammo Gas Ltd (The Baleares)181 who, in the commercial arbitration 
context, rejected this broader interpretation of the term ‘question of law’ as a ‘redundant 
piece of baggage from an era when the statutory regime governing arbitration and the 
judicial philosophy towards arbitration, was far more interventionist that it is today’182 
but noted that the power to review a finding of fact of a tribunal on the ground that there 
is no evidence to support it, and that there is therefore an error of law, is appropriate for 
public law cases.183  
 
This broader interpretation of the term ‘question of law’ is also consistent with leading 
authorities in the area of judicial review. In particular, in the House of Lords’ decision in 
Edwards v Bairstow,184 the defendant alleged that the General Commissioners of Income 
Tax had made an error of law in finding that a transaction to which he was a party was 
not ‘an adventure or concern in the nature of trade’ for tax purposes. Viscount Simonds 
stated that the finding that the transaction was not ‘an adventure or concern in the nature 
of trade’ is an inference of fact but could be set aside because it appeared that the 
                                                        
v City & St James [2003] EWHC 215 (Ch); Benaim (UK) Ltd v Davies, Middleton & Davies Ltd [2005] 
1370 (TCC). 
181Geogas SA v. Trammo Gas Ltd (The Baleares) [1993] 1 Lloyd's Rep 215. 
182ibid 228. 
183ibid 232. 
184[1956] AC 14. See also the following arbitration case-law citing this line of authority: Pioneer Shipping 
Ltd v. BTP Tioxide Ltd (The Nema) (No.2) [1982] AC 724, 742; London Underground Ltd v. Citylink 
Telecommunications Ltd [2007] EWHC 1749 (TCC) at [53]-[56]; Mary Harvey v Motor Insurers’ Bureau 
(QBD (Merc) (Manchester), Claim No: 0MA40077, 21 December 2011) at [20]-[25] and [55]-[56].  
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Commissioners had acted without any evidence or on a view of the facts which could not 
reasonably be entertained.185 Similarly, Lord Radcliffe stated that an error in law arises if 
the facts found are such that ‘no person acting judicially and properly instructed as to the 
relevant law could have come to the determination under appeal’.186  
 
Turning to the test that the courts should use to determine whether the tribunal has erred 
in law in the context of public-private arbitration awards, the appeal process under section 
69 comprises two stages - first, the leave to appeal stage which acts as an initial filter and, 
secondly, the appeal itself. For the leave stage, as outlined above, the test for correctness 
should require only that the decision of the tribunal is open to doubt. Once the leave stage 
has been passed, a stricter approach at the appeal stage is justified187 and, it is submitted 
that, while the manner in which a tribunal ascertains the facts should not be reviewable, 
the manner in which it ascertains the law and its final conclusion, in light of both the facts 
and the law, should be subject to review. Thus, an error of law should be inferred not only 
when the tribunal has stated the law wrongly, but also when the tribunal has stated the 
law correctly but it has arrived at a different conclusion from the one which a correct 
application of the law to the facts would inevitably lead.188 Accordingly, while the fact 
that the court would have arrived at a different answer than the one arrived at by the 
tribunal is insufficient to overturn the award, the tribunal’s conclusion on a question of 
public law should be reviewable as to whether it is ‘out of conformity with the only 
correct answer or lies outside the range of correct answers’.189  
                                                        
185ibid 29-31. 
186ibid 36. 
187R. Merkin and L. Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996 (5th edn, informa law 2014) 331. 
188Vinava Shipping Co Ltd v Finelvet AG (The Chrysalis) [1983] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 503, 507.  
189ibid.  
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Turning to our second proposal which is designed to address the threat posed by the 
private and confidential nature of arbitration to the public law norms of openness and 
accountability, it is submitted that a distinction should also be introduced between purely 
commercial arbitrations and public-private arbitrations and greater weight should be 
given to the public law norms of openness and accountability in relation to the latter.190 
In particular, it is submitted that, in respect of public-private arbitration claims which 
come before the courts, public hearings should be permitted more frequently. This could 
be achieved through amending Rule 62.10(2) of the Civil Procedure Rules to provide that 
Rule 39.2 of the Civil Procedure Rules (which states that the default rule is that a hearing 
is to be in public) should apply to public-private arbitrations. Rule 39.2 also recognises 
that a private hearing may be required in certain exceptional circumstances (for example, 
where it involves confidential information and publicity would damage that 
confidentiality). The application of these exceptions in relation to public-private 
arbitration claims would ensure that the legitimate interests of the parties are protected 
and that inherently confidential information (such as commercially sensitive information 
of a financial, scientific or technical nature) does not enter the public domain. In 
conjunction with this amendment, a carve-out should also be inserted into Rule 62.10(3) 
to clarify that the default position that arbitration claims (apart from those under sections 
45 and 69) are held in private does not apply to public-private arbitration claims.  
 
                                                        
190See Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, ‘Developing commercial law 
through the courts: rebalancing the relationship between the courts and arbitration’, The Bailii Lecture 
2016, 9 March 2016 at [23] and [49]. 
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Jurisprudential developments could also assist in ensuring that the public law norms of 
openness and accountability are applied in respect of public-private arbitrations. For 
example, as under Rule 62.10(1) it is open to the courts to make an order that an 
arbitration claim be held in public in any case, an increased willingness on the part of the 
courts to make such orders could have a similar effect to the proposed amendments to 
Rule 62.10(2) and (3). Furthermore, the scope of the current, jurisprudentially developed, 
‘public-interest’-related exception to the general principle of confidentiality should be 
further defined (and possibly expanded) in respect of public-private arbitrations to allow 
for disclosure of information related to such arbitrations where there is an overriding 
public interest in doing so. Finally, while there has already been some recognition in 
English case law that, in contrast to documents and information disclosed in arbitration 
proceedings, arbitration awards should be capable of being published (at least in a 
redacted or summary form),191 this jurisprudence should be further developed in respect 
of public-private arbitration awards.192  
 
While these proposals, and in particular the suggested expansion of the scope of sections 
45 and 69, may appear to run counter to the trend, worldwide and in England, towards 
reduction of court intervention in the arbitration process,193 the changes proposed are 
                                                        
191n 122 above.  
192See B. Rix, ‘Confidentiality in International Arbitration: Virtue or Vice?’ Jones Day Professorship in 
Commercial Law Lecture, SMU, Singapore, 12 March 2015 arguing for curtailment of the confidentiality 
principle in respect of arbitration awards. 
193cf R. Finch, ‘London: still the cornerstone of international commercial arbitration and commercial law?’ 
(2004) 70 Arbitration 256, 264-265; Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, 
‘Developing commercial law through the courts: rebalancing the relationship between the courts and 
arbitration’, The Bailii Lecture 2016, 9 March 2016 at [32]-[34]. 
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tailored to address specific threats to the public interest identified in respect of public-
private arbitrations and it is submitted that they go no further than is necessary to do so. 
In particular, introduction of a ground for review of factual errors is not proposed as there 
are no grounds to suggest that the ability of arbitrators to make findings of fact is reduced 
where disputes implicating the public interest are concerned and as permitting an 
extensive re-assessment of arbitral fact-finding would undermine the autonomy of the 
arbitration process.194 Secondly, in order to ensure that the benefits of arbitration in terms 
of finality and expediency are preserved to the greatest extent possible, it is proposed that 
many of the existing limitations on the scope of sections 45 and 69 would also apply to 
the new form of review proposed in respect of public-private arbitrations. Such 
restrictions include the limits placed on the right to appeal the decision of the court under 
sections 45(6) and 69(8) respectively and the requirement to obtain leave to appeal in 
respect of section 69 applications. In addition, in relation to section 69 in particular, the 
proposed tests for determining whether the tribunal has erred in law at both the leave to 
appeal and appeal stages strike an appropriate balance between the autonomy of the 
arbitral process and the public interest in ensuring that public laws are considered in 
public-private arbitrations by preventing the reviewing court from substituting its own 
decision for that of the tribunal. Thirdly, application of the current requirement under 
sections 45(4) and 69(4) (requiring that the question of law be identified as well as the 
grounds on which it is said that the question should be decided by the court or that leave 
to appeal should be granted), together with the well-embedded policy in English law for 
minimal judicial intervention, 195  will ensure that attempts to take advantage of the 
expanded scope of review under sections 45 and 69 to delay or disrupt the arbitral process 
                                                        
194See Geogas SA v. Trammo Gas Ltd (The Baleares) [1993] 1 Lloyd's Rep 215, 228. 
195See Arbitration Act 1996, s.1(c). 
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are likely to fail. Moreover, given that the vast majority of international disputes being 
arbitrated in England are of an exclusively commercial nature and that, in many cases, 
the law applicable to the substance of the dispute will not be English law (meaning that 
sections 45 and 69 will, in any event, not be applicable),196 the suggested amendments 
will not affect the framework for resolving such disputes. Accordingly, any concerns that 
the amendments would have reputational implications for England as an arbitration-
friendly jurisdiction, particularly in the context of the prolonged uncertainty associated 
with the outcome of the recent referendum suggesting that the UK leaves the EU, are 
misplaced.  
 
Finally, the proposals are in line with developments in the law of judicial review, in 
particular, the abandonment of the distinction between jurisdictional and non-
jurisdictional errors of law.197 The proposals are also consistent with developments in 
other jurisdictions, for example, the recognition by the French courts that, where the 
application of mandatory public laws is concerned, a different approach to the review of 
arbitral awards is warranted198 and, more generally, with the application in many civil 
law jurisdictions of a distinct set of legal principles to public-private contracts where 
disputes under such contracts have public interest implications.199 Further, the proposals 
relating to transparency would serve to bring English arbitration law in line with 
legislative developments in other jurisdictions such as France and Brazil, which have 
recognised the need for increased transparency in arbitrations involving public bodies,200 
                                                        
196See Arbitration Act 1996, s. 82(1).  
197Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147. 
198 See Section V above. 
199 See Section VI above. 
200 See Section V above. 
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and with developments in the area of investment treaty arbitration such as the recent 
advent of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State 
Arbitration. 201 
 
IX. Conclusion  
 
English arbitration law has been characterised as a mature and highly developed body of 
law. While this is certainly the case in relation to commercial disputes, as English law 
lacks a distinct legal and conceptual framework for public-private arbitration and regards 
arbitration and public law as occupying separate legal spheres, the same cannot be said 
in respect of public-private arbitration. Rather the existing arbitration framework does not 
adequately account for the public interest in public-private arbitration. Therefore, this 
article argues that there is a need to reconceptualise public-private arbitration and to 
subject it to public law values. While engaging with this reconceptualisation process 
would require a willingness to depart from existing practices and principles, this 
reconceptualisation is necessary to ensure that the rise of public-private arbitration does 
not lead to the subjugation of the public interest to the hallowed arbitral principle of party 
autonomy. 
 
                                                        
201UNCITRAL, Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (effective date 1 April 
2014). See also United Nations, Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, 
adopted by resolution of the General Assembly on 10 December 2014 and opened for signature on 17 
March 2015.  
